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1 – INTRODUCTION: literature review; objectives and scope of the research  
 
In this section of the book, we will discuss the relationships between business and risk culture in financial 
institutions, particularly in banking.  
Organisational culture is a complex construct. There are many factors that affect it. Some of them are shared 
by all the employees and lead to homogenous patterns of behaviours. They are unifying factors, such as the 
history of the firm, the country in which it operates, the market environment, the ownership model, th 
regulation. Other factors come from individual and group cultures and operate as differentiating factors. If they 
are shared by a significant group of persons inside the firm, they create what are called “subcultures”: 
functional cultures, regional cultures (in firms geo raphicaly diversified), professional cultures, business 
cultures (in firms strategically diversified).  
The nature of the business in which the firm operates is one of the main determinants of the organisation l 
culture. Every business faces specific regulatory, competitive and economic problems and the employees 
strictly interact and develop successful ways to handle with them. If the firm operates in one single business, 
the business culture acts as a unifying factor. On the contrary, in the case of diversified, large andcomplex 
financial institutions, business culture works as a differentiating factor.  
The scientific literature on this topic is poor, peri heral and we didn’t find any systematic work on the subject. 
There are many studies on corporate culture and risk culture, without specific reference to businesses and 
related differences. In the aftermath of the financi l risis, reseach centres, professional associatins, 
consultancy firms and regulators have studied the risk culture of financial institutions. Often these inquiries 
make some reference to specific businesses; some of th m regard single categories of financial intermediaries 
(Spicer et alii, 2014, Salz Review, 2013, Protiviti, 2012, Robinson, Ware, 2011). All these studies are 
descriptive and do not deal with the topic in a systematic way.  
Research on organizational subcultures gives an helpful framework to study business culture (in diversified 
financial institutions, business culture may be defined as a subculture). It is possible to make a distinction 
between organisational cultures that are cohesive and unitary, or integrated, those characterised as collections 
of subcultures, or differentiated, and those that are fragmented, ambiguous and open to members’ multiple 
interpretations (Martin, 1992). 
Boisner and Chatman (2002) underline how organisation l subcultures may be based on different sources: 
membership in various groups, such as departments, workgroups, and teams; levels of hierarchies, such as 
management versus support staff; professional and occupational affiliations; physical location in the 
organisation; socio-demographic categories, such as sex, ethnicity, age, or nationality; informal groups like 
those formed by friendships; and performance-related variables such as organisational commitment and work
performance. 
Schein (1988) makes a distinction between pivotal values and peripherals values. The former are central  to n 
organisation’s functioning and are shared by all employees. The latter are not essential and can be rejected by 
some part of the firm. The subcultures share pivotal, but not peripherals values; the countercultures refuse also 
the former ones. Tushman and O’ Reilly (1997) explain how subunits can espouse some values that are 
fundamental for them but peripherals for the organis tion, and at the same time they can accept the core pivotal 
values. 
Another problem in this area of research is the lack of quantitative data. It is very difficult to measure the risk 
culture, and we did not find any statistical analysis about the relationship between risk culture and 
businesses.We are forced to rely on anedoctical evidence, on case studies, on qualitative self evaluation by the 
practitioners (as  in the case of  surveys conducte by consultancy firms).  
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When exploring business risk culture, there are twomain lines of research. The first one regards the 
characteristics of business risk culture, the second e is about the coexistence of different busines risk 
cultures in the same organisation. Under the first point of view, the research questions are the following:  
- Does it exist a peculiar risk culture, for every and single business,? Is the nature of the business one of 
the drivers of organisational risk culture ? 
- More specifically, what are the business—related determinants of risk culture ?  
The second line of research regards the study of diversified financial institutions. The relationship between the 
different business cultures can vary, according to alternative models: an integration-model where the bank tries 
to form a common culture across different businesses; a fragmentation-model where the businesses are kept 
separate and their different risk cultures coexist; a conflict-model where the different cultures fight to get 
leadership and become the dominating and integratin culture (in this last case, other business cultures can 
survive as subcultures). On this topic, the relevant research questions are the following: 
- Is the coexistence of different business risk cultures possible inside the same organization ? When ? 
What are the pros and the cons ? 
- On the basis of which factors does a business risk culture become dominant over others ? 
- Does a best model to manage different business subcult res exist ? If so, is it integration, fragmentation 
or domination ? What are the relevant factors to consider in order to make this choice ? 
The two lines of research, the categories of relevant riables and their connections are shown in the figure 1 
below (for its comment, see § 3.2.). 
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In the present contribution, we will follow the first line of research. This choice is motivated both by editorial 
standards (length limits of every chapter) and by theoretical sequence (firstly we must know what busine s 
cultures are, and only after how to manage their relationships). 
The aims of the present chapter are:  
- to present the available quantitative and qualitative evidences on business risk cultures (descriptive 
aim); 
- to provide a conceptual framework helpful to investigate in a systematic way the business risk cultures 
and to understand what are the main factors that differentiate them (theoretical aim); the lack of data 
doesn’t allow, at the moment, to test the validity of the linkages between these factors and business 
culture, or to estimate their relative importance. 
 
 
2. INTRODUCTORY CONCEPTS: definition and components of risk culture and its relationships with 
organisational culture 
 
Before starting our analysis, it is helpulf to make cl ar some basic concepts and definitions about risk culture. 
We will discuss three issues: the relationships betwe n corporate culture and risk culture, the definitio  of risk 
culture, the components of risk culture. 
Firstly, we consider risk culture as being a part of the general organisational and business culture. Th  corporate 
culture shapes the beliefs, attitudes and behaviours in all the different aspects of organisational life: purpose 
of the firm, performance, external relationships with customers and suppliers, internal relationships between 
units and individuals, risk, etc.. 
Secondly, we define risk culture as: ”A bank’s norms, attitudes and behaviors related to risk awareness, risk 
taking and risk management and controls that shape decisions on risks. Risk culture influences the decisions 
of management and employees during the day-to-day activities and has an impact on the risks they assume» 
(FSB, 2014; Basel Committee, 2015). Or, alternatively: “ Risk culture can be defined as the norms and 
traditions of behavior of individuals and of groups within an organization that determine the way in which they 
identify, understand, discuss, and act on the risksthe organization confronts and the risks it takes” (IIF, 2009). 
Together with organisational rules and controls, the risk culture determines the effective capacity of the 
decision makers to understand, evaluate and manage risk.  
Risk culture is a neutral theoretical construct; every organisation has a risk culture, the content of which may 
be different1. The risk can be viewed in a negative or in a positive way, as a problem to avoid or as an 
opportunity to get. Often, when we talk about risk culture, what we mean in reality is a “healthy risk culture” 
or “sound risk culture” (FSB, 2014, p. 1) or “risk intelligent culture” (Deloitte, 2012). In this case, the general 
construct is qualified with some prescriptive attributes, through a process of judgment/evaluation. An healty 
risk culture can be defined as a culture which: a) it is aware of the risk and gives adequate attention to it and 
b) orients organisational behaviours towards the optimal management of risk, in line with the objectives of the 
firm (risk appetite). 
In this perspective, it is necessary to distinguish between an healty risk culture and risk avoidance. Th  former 
aims to optimize the taking and the management of risk, not necessarily to minimise it2. An healty risk culture 
favours the right setting of risk objectives, their sharing by all the personnel, an effective risk management, a 
continuous and careful monitoring of the risk3. 
                                                          
1 To make an analogy, every company has a customer culture, the content of which may vary: some companies see 
customer as a contractual counterparty (a competitor, as Porter suggests in his “five forces model”), others as a partner. 
2 This distinction is particularly relevant for finacial institutions. They receive from the society the mandate to assume 
the risk on behalf of economic agents and their productive function essentially consists in the managig of financial risks. 
They should not avoid the risk, for at least two reasons: they earn money from the taking of risk (in the case of speculative 
risks) and they are asked to keep the risk in order to free the economic agents from it. 
3 “A sound risk culture consistently supports appropriate riskawareness, behaviours and judgements about risk-taking 
within a strong risk governance framework. A sound risk culture bolsters effective risk management, promotes sound 
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Risk aversion is not synonimous of healty culture, as demonstrated by too bureaucratic and conservative 
financial institutions, with a sluggish performance. In fact, they put at the centre of their values not the risk, 
but the controls and the compliance to procedures. They have, as a dominant culture, a “control culture” or a 
“compliance culture”, not a “risk culture”4. Chase Manhattan bank in the 1970s and 1980s is an example of 
this (Rogers, 1992). The bank had a very risk-averse culture: it was bureaucratic, conservative, patern listic, 
“gentlemanly and polite”; it refused conflicts, protected senior managers from bad news, was fearful of 
mistakes, hampered internal communication. This culture resisted to market changes and worked as an obstacle 
to the necessary adaptation of bank. Maybe it helped to contain credit and market risks, but it generated a very 
high competitive risk, and led to the decline of the bank.  
At the opposite side, normally the risky businesses (e.g. insurance, securities underwriting and trading) have a 
strong risk culture. The investment banks were the first to introduce the advanced methods in risk measurement 
and risk control. Nevertheless, they assumed excessive ri ks in the years previous to the financial crisis and 
some of them failed or were bail-out. Was it a problem of an unealthy risk culture ? Were some cultural artifacts 
advanced (risk management tools) while the risk culture was weakening ? Or, differently, were these banks 
aware of the risks taken, but their tools went wrong a d undervalued risks ? Was it a problem of culture or a 
problem of organisational instruments ? 
Thirdly, for what concerns the components of risk culture, it is helpful to distinguish three main categories of 
risk (see Figure 2) 
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Risk culture must be sound under all three aspects quoted in the table above. For example, the risk culture of 
some investment banks was healthy on the productive side (supported by advanced risk management systems), 
but flawed on ethics and on the way they treated customers. Moreover, the “mix” of strengths and weaknesses, 
along the three different kinds of risks, might be different in different businesses. 
                                                          
risk-taking, and ensures that emerging risks or risk-taking activities beyond the institution’s risk appetite are recognised, 
assessed, escalated and addressed in a timely manner” (FSB, 2014, p. 1) 
4. The culture is an internal motivator that drives behaviour “when nobody sees it”. It helps individuals to make 
discretionary decisions and to act inside their sphere of autonomy. An healty risk culture stimulates proactive behaviours 
(e.g. reporting issues of concerns, whistle blowing, suggesting improvements to risk management), activates social 
control, dissuades from exploiting controls’ loopholes to heighten performance. Instead, rules and controls are external 
motivators; they are organisational mechanisms, not embedded values.  
5 Some components of customer and compliance risk are grouped in the (mis)conduct risk, a relative new area of concern 
for the regulator. According to ESRB, “Misconduct risk refers to risks attached to the way in which a firm and its staff 
conduct themselves. As such, it includes how customers and investors are treated, mis-selling of financial products, 
violation of rules and manipulation of markets.” (ESRB, 2015) 
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As an example of the usefulness of the three risk cultures model, we quote the empirical work of Cohn et alii, 
(2015), which showed how bank employees took significant less risks in their investment choices when their 
professional identity was reminded to them. They invested more than twenty percent less in the risky asets, 
relative to the control group. Moreover, this risk aversion was higher for employees from core busines units, 
i.e. those who worked as traders, investment bankers, and wealth managers. The e findings therefore contradict 
the conventional thinking that the culture of the banking industry encourages its employees to take higher risks. 
But the same subjects, when their professional identity was made more salient, were ready to increase their
earnings by behaving dishonestly (Cohn et alii, 2014). “As the willingness to cheat and break rules for the sake 
of personal benefit could also be a potentially important determinant of excessive risk-taking, the combined 
results of both studies raise the question whether the problem of excessive risk-taking is associated with a 
problematic “ethical culture” rather than a problematic risk culture” (Cohn et alii, 2015)6. 
Another problem, in studying risk culture in financial institutions, is the difference between espoused values 
(what we say we do) and practiced values (what we actually do). The former are found in formal documents 
such as cultural manifestos, mission statements, codes f conduct. The latter reside in the heart and the brain 
of employees, and guide their behaviours. In the cas  of British retail banks, the values most quoted in official 
documents were customer centricity, transparency, itegrity, benefit for the community, simplicity. Only one 
bank (Virgin Money) talked about making “fair but non excessive” profit. Unfortunately, the actual values that 
led the decision making of managers and employees wre quite different: “an aggressive sales culture which 
rewarded staff for aggressively promoting financial products, irrespective of risk and customer needs” (Spicer 
et alii, 2014, p. 9).   
 
 
3. BUSINESS RISK CULTURE: are business risk cultures in the financial sector different? Why? How? 
 
3.1. Does a “business risk culture” exists ? 
In recent years, financial system has got through a difficult situation: excessive risk taking and increase in 
credit, market and operational losses, growth in misselling and regulatory breaches and consequent rise in 
fines, worsening of reputation. These problems are not uniformly widespred, but depend on geography and 
businesses.  
A Deloitte survey (Deloitte, 2013) shows that in the banking industry the perception of cultural problems is 
higher for US and British banks than for Asian banks (European banks are in the middle). As far as the business 
is concerned, the situation is worse for investment banks, followed by universal banks. On the contrary, for 
retail banks and mutuals banks (building societies and their equivalents), the cultural weaknesses seem to be 
lower.  
Also anedoctical evidence and case study analysis (see below, §4) demonstrate how the risk culture is strongly 
affected by the business in which the banks operate. A r port from The Economist (The Economist, 2013) lists 
the top ten fines incurred by banks in the USA, from 451 millions dollars for Barclays (Libor manipulation) to 
1.9 billions for HSBC (money laundering lapses). In all cases, the institutions involved are large and complex 
universal banks or investment banks. These kinds of banks show significant ethical weaknesses7. Almost three-
quarters (71%) of investment bankers interviewed in the survey think that career progression would be tricky 
without being “flexible” over ethical standards; instead, the average value for the total sample is 56%. 
These evidences seem to confirm that in the forging of risk culture the nature of business matters. We expect 
the business risk cultures to be different under three aspects: a) its importance, i.e. the attention given to risk 
and its role inside organisational culture; b) the trade-off between return and risk, i.e. the risk appetite and c) 
the nature of the risks that are peculiar to the business, e.g. credit risk in commercial banking versus market 
risk in trading vs reputational risk in private banking. 
The link between risk culture and business is acknowledged also by the regulator: “Supervisors should consider 
whether an institution’s risk culture is appropriate for the scale, complexity, and nature of its busine s and 
                                                          
6 Cohn et alii separate the “ethical culture” from the “risk culture”. Our “three risk cultures model” is based on wider 
definition of risk, that includes not only the more t aditional financial risks (“productive risks”), but also the compliance, 
reputational, conduct and ethical risks (”customer risk” and “compliance risk”). 
7 The data quoted in the Report are limited to legal and compliance risk. They exclude productive and customer risks. 
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based on sound, articulated values which are carefully managed by the leadership of the financial institution”. 
(FSB, 2014, p.2)  
 
3.2. What are the determinants of business risk culture ? 
 
We propose a general framework helpful to analyse in a systematic the more relevant determinants of business 
risk culture (see Figure 1). We have selected the factors that are more strictly linked, directly or indirectly, 
with the nature of the business8. We group these drivers in three general categories : structural, contingent and 
evolutionary factors.  
Put in a simple way: business risk cultures are different because businesses are different (structural factors) 
and are exposed in different ways to some external factors that affect risk culture (contingent factors). 
Moreover, because of the changing of the contingent factors, business risk evolve through the time; thy can 
become more similar or more different (evolutionary factors).  
 
a) Structural/endogenous factors 
The first determinant of business risk culture is the nature of the business itself. Without pretension to be 
exhaustive, we list below some of the business-driven factors that affect the risk culture: 
- the activities performed and their embedded risks. Different activites imply risks that are different under 
many aspects: a) nature, e.g. commercial banking is linked to credit and liquidity risks, asset management to 
reputational risk, trading to market risk); b) time horizons, e.g. market risk is very volatile and short term, 
credit risk is a medium term risk, c) effects on financial results, e.g. productive risks generate economic losses 
of various intensity, conduct risk causes a loss of customers and compliance costs, liquidity and reputational 
risks can rapidly lead to the failure of the institution. In the mass market businesses with economies of scale 
and standardized processes (e.g. retail banking, payments), risks are different comparing to high-tailored and 
service-intensive businesses (e.g. investment banking, wealth management).  
- the nature and role of customers: the characteristics of customer relationships vary depending on the business. 
Customers are very important in corporate banking and wealth management, quite important in retail banking, 
do not exist, or are simply counterparties, in securities trading and sales9. By consequence, the relevance of 
customer, compliance and reputational risks is different Also the optimal risk/return combinations customers 
are looking for are variable. In the asset management industry, high net worth individuals who address to hedge 
funds are more inclined to risk than retail customers who invest in mutual funds or pension funds; 
- the economics of business: it is not possibile to make profits in proprietary t ading without taking substantial 
risks, nor to earn money in investment banking withou  innovation (and the related risks); on the other hand 
retail banking, with lower and more stable earnings, may require a more cautious approach.  
 
Every business has its own hierarchy of priorities b tween risk and other performance dimensions. It looks for 
different solutions to the typical managerial trade-offs: e.g. short term profitability vs ethical conduct, 
shareholder interests vs stakeholder interests, entrepreneurial spirit vs compliance to rules, flexibility vs 
control. 
In one of the most important studies about bank culture, Rogers (1992) describes the three business subcult res 
in Citicorp: 
a) Consumer banking culture: a mass market culture (“MacDonald’s culture”), whose values were cost-
control, bureaucracy, standardisaton of products, stability and predictability; 
                                                          
8 We neglect many factors, that affect risk culture, but are not steadily related with specific characteris ic of the businesses: 
e.g. quality of corporate and risk governance, committment of top management (tone from the top), horizontal information 
sharing, active learning from mistakes, openness of communication, role of risk management and control functions, 
compensation systems, etc.  Some of them are explicitely onsidered by regulatory authorities 
9 See Tarullo (2014): “This second concern recalls the much-discussed issue of whether  a trading mentality h s migrated 
to other parts of large financial firms, sothat the position communicated by management to both employees and others is 
that the firm has no “customers” or “clients”, only counterparties. While such an attitude is typical for trading in 
anonymous markets or with equally sophisticated institutions, it hardly seems designed to engender trust on the part of 
those who have ongoing relationships with the firm” 
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b) Investment banking culture, deal-doing, antibureaucr tic, short-term oriented, whose core values were 
innovation, entrepreneurship, speed, flexibility;  
c) Institutional bank culture (wholesale business), in an intermediate position: it emphasised the long 
term relationship with corporate customers, but at the same time shared with consumer banking culture 
the standardization of products and processes.  
The propensity to risk in investment banking was higher than in consumer banking. There were conflicts 
between the three risk cultures. The investment bankers were seen as greed, lacking sense of loyalty to he 
bank. As a senior manager said: “They move too fast, without looking at risk. They don’t care that much about 
the bank” (Rogers, 1992, p. 63) 
We can generalize the results of Roger’s analysis and add some further considerations about retail and 
investment banking. To a certain extent, these two businesses are placed at the opposite side of the spectrum 
of risk cultures.  
Traditionally, the retail business has been quite stable and static. It is a mass-market business, where size, 
economies of scale and process and product standardisation are critical success factors. Efficiency, stability 
and predictability are core values. At the same time, it is a “relationship business”, characterised by personal 
and lasting relationship with customers, who belong to the same local community in which the bank operates 
(this is especially true for community and mutual bnks). The approach to risk is quite conservative. The
control of risk comes before innovation and entrepreneurship. The main risk are credit and liquidity risk; the 
culture of the bank is a “credit culture”. Retail banks are bureaucratic, “command and control” organisations; 
hierarchy and rules limit individual authonomy and mitigate risks. 
Investment banking is a very complex industry, thatincludes many lines of activities, with different productive 
processes, customers, economics, risks. Therefore, business cultures are very dissimilar.  
Services to corporations (e.g. underwriting, corporate finance, M&A, securitization, IPOs, private equity, 
advisory) put at the centre the complex needs of the customers. Business models vary: in the American model 
of investment banking, the relationship with the cli nt lasts as long as the deal lasts; instead the traditional 
British model is centred on independent advice and lo g-term relationship (Augar, 2010, p. 224) Customers 
are very smart, the competencies of the personnel very high, services sophisticated, customised and inovative. 
The market is very competitive and dynamic; competitiv  and reputational risks are significant. The 
organisation is quite decentralised and appreciates flexibility, authonomy and problem solving attitude. The 
complexity of services requires teamwork. Many values are common to innovative companies: creativity, 
autonomy, innovation and related propensity to risk(Lyons et alii, 2007).10. The control of risk is important, 
but it should not hamper the entrepreneurial spirit and the efforts to find innovative solutions. Organis tional 
tools (advanced risk management systems) and performance measures and objectives are more important th 
rules and hierarchy as a risk control mechanism.  
In asset management and proprietary trading, the direct counterparty of operations is the capital market; the 
customer does not exist; it is an impersonal busines es, transaction-based, with short time horizons. Risk-
taking is the rule of the game and risk exposures ar  c refully measured and monitored. The main risk is market 
risk (and to a minor extent, counterparty risk). Traders are individually responsible for short term results, that 
if attained trigger large bonuses. The organizationl climate is very competitive.  
In capital markets divisions of large US investment banks, salespeople work together with traders. But their 
risk culture is very different. Salesmen are customer oriented and risk averse and this can create a cultural 
clash. Lewis (1989) and Smith (2012) illustrate well this cultural conflict. In the course of time, the relative 
power of organisational units shifted: thanks to its brilliant financial results, the trading department captivised 
the sale department. Placing products and earning commissions overcame the customers’ interests and the 
fiduciary duties of the bank towards them.  
Ware e Robinson (2011) explore the common and the differentiating core values of the three subcultures of 
investment banking, that they call tribes: investment, operations, distribution11. The core of the investment 
                                                          
10 “The notion of significant interaction with one’s clients is considered a best practice in investment ba king, and this 
extends to other professional service businesses. At many investment banks, the concept of anticipating client needs is 
sacred. For example, one business principle at Goldman Sachs states that “we consistently strive to anticipate the rapidly 
changing needs of our clients.” Lyons et alii, 2007 
11 . They are described as follows: a) Investment professionals: Portfolio managers, analysts, and other strategists who are 
making the investment decisions; b) Distribution professionals: marketing, client service, and PR experts who are dealing 
with all the client-facing and distribution efforts; c) Operations professionals: accounting, finance, compliance and all 
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banking culture (pivotal values) consists of four values shared by all the three tribes: client satisfaction, ethical 
integrity, professional standing, collaboration and team approach. But the tribes differentiate themselve  on 
peripheral values (see Figure 3). Investment subculture is defined as “effective decision making in a 
meritocracy”; it has a strong sense of confidence (oft n shifting towards arrogance). The distribution subculture 
is defined as: “compete and win”: it is very competitive, driven by performance (market and financial results), 
exposed to risk of misselling when the environment is difficult. Operations subculture is defined as: “creating 
scalable processes and efficiency”; it is centred on attention to details, rationalisation of work, caution, 
compliance to rules, bureaucracy.  
Difference originates conflict. Distribution and Operations staff expresses a sense of disempowerment or 
disrespect; they feel like the “lower class” confroting with the Investment tribe, considered as the “upper 
class”. Distribution and Operations collide also between them: competitive/win values contrast with 
efficiency/precision values. Distribution people are action oriented and driving for results; the Operations 
teams are required to be fully compliant.  
 
 
FIGURE 3: THE THREE TRIBES: subcultures in investment banking 
 
  
Source: Ware and Robinson, 2011 
 
 
In Barclays, a large and diversified institution with business cultures difficult to integrate with each other12, 
“the investment bankers tended to regard the retail bank as slow, indecisive and un-commercial. In contrast, 
the investment banking characteristics were hard-working, fast, competitive and well rewarded success” (Salz 
Review, 2013, p. 87). The Barclays’ Corporate Bank, while quite distinctive and emphasizing integrity, was 
described in the report as being relatively conservative, hierarchical and slow-moving, perhaps reflecting an 
emphasis on tenure and loyalty over performance. Th culture of the Group central functions was described 
by business units as highly expert, but slow to respond and overly internally focused (Salz Review, 2013, p. 
87). 
A theoretical framework useful to understand the different cultures in business is the “Competing Values 
Framework” by Quinn and Cameron (2011). It classifie  cultures on two dimensions: i) stability versus 
                                                          
support functions within the firm. When employees are sked, “Are the cultures of operations vs. distribu ion vs. 
investments more different or more alike in your firm?” the overwhelming answer (75%) is: “different”. 
12 The cultural integration efforts were made more difficult because of the rapid growth of the bank, the multiple 
reorganisations and the extensive external hiring.  
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flexibility and ii) internal versus external focus. We can apply this framework in the analysis of the business 
risk cultures, obtaining alternative combinations (McConnell, 2013). Hierarchy model emphasises tability and 
control, formalised structures and rules and internal efficiency; it is a “bureaucrati  culture”. In banking, it might 
be typified by credit card operations or a mortgage-processing unit. Clan model values collaboration, participation 
and teamwork; it expresses a 'family' culture. It might be typified by a merchant banking group. Market model is 
based on values such as competition, market share and profitability; it represents a “results oriented” culture. It 
might be typified by trading units and sales functions. Adhocracy model values innovation, risk taking and 
creativity. It is an “entrepreneurial” culture. It might be typified by a Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) group. 
 
FIGURE 4: COMPETING VALUES FRAMEWORK AND ITS APPLICATION TO BUSINESS RISK 
CULTURES 
 
Source: Quinn and Cameron, 2011  
 
b) Contingent/exogenous factors 
The contingent factors are not intrinsically related to the business. They affect it indirectly and they can change 
over time. Moreover, they normally operate differently in various businesses and therefore they become a 
differentiating driver of the business risk culture. The most important are the following: 
- Market competitiveness 
- Regulation 
- History and evolution of the business  
- Size and diversification of the financial institution  
- Ownerhip model 
- National culture 
- Strategic orientation 
- Organisational systems and practices  
- Employees’ individual culture 
 
The market competitiveness creates pressures to increase the level of performance. Making financial results 
and improving market position (climbing up the bank ranking) become more important than managing the risk 
accurately13. On the opposite side, an excessive exposure to misconduct risk is favoured from a lack of 
                                                          
13 The positive correlation between the degree of competitiveness and the risk propensity has some exceptions. In the 
1990s, the asset management industry in UK was verycompetitive, with a transparent confrontation between the 
investment performance of the fund managers. They became scared of underperforming and started to adopt m re 
imitative and risk averse investment behaviours (Augar, 2010, p. 20) 
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competiton. The limited choice of banks increases the risk of mis-selling and tacit collusion in highly 
concentrated markets makes easier to manipulate the benchmarks or to charge predatory prices to customers 
(ESRB, 2015).The degree of competition varies across bu inesses. Large universal banks and investment banks 
that compete in global markets face a more competitiv  market than community banks, or specialised 
institutions, or boutique investment banks. Also the conjuncture of the market is relevant: when the economy 
is in a good shape, the attention to credit and liquid ty risks decreases; when the capital markets are booming, 
the attention to market risk is lower than when the markets are bursting. 
The regulation affects risk culture with contradictory effects. On one hand, more regulation contributes to an 
healtier risk culture: the risk-based supervision strenghtens the banks’ focus on risk and the regulatory 
guidelines underline the importance of the culture of risk. On the other hand, more regulation might weaken 
the risk culture, because it shifts the attention fr m the risk culture to the compliance on rules. Anyway, less 
regulated sector are generally more risk oriented than more regulated ones. There are many examples: th  
hedge funds versus mutual funds, shadow banking versus traditional banking, investment banking versus 
commercial banking. Moreover, protective regulation (e.g. deposit insurance schemes) can generate moral
hazard and, again, reduce the risk aversion of the firm.  
The history of the business is important under at least two points of view. Firstly, past success creates and 
consolidates culture. As the literature highlights (Schein, 2010), culture is the sum of values and behaviours 
that are proved to be effective in solving problems and assuring results. Moreover, the success of the bank 
leads to “organisational optimism”, a self-reinforcing cognitive bias that reduces attention to risk (Kahneman 
and Lovallo, 1993). “A good risk culture can break down when times are good” (McConnell, 2013, p. 40).The 
prudent risk culture of retail banking has been consolidated through a long period of relative stability of the 
markets and good financial results. The oustanding profit and growth outcomes of US investment banks at the 
beginning of 2000s strengthened their aggressive risk culture. In the past, the majority of Italian banks were 
non profit or state owned and this deeply affected th ir risk culture. Secondly, in history there are moments of 
change, gradual or disruptive. The strong forces towards deregulation, competition and free markets, common 
to all sectors of the financial system, have changed th  business culture, shifting it towards the acceptance of 
higher levels of risk.   
Also the size and the degree of diversification f financial institutions are important. In the case of large size 
and rapid growth, organisational cohesion is weakened. The headquarters are far from customers14. The 
infrastructure of risk management and controls is put under pressure. The bank needs more people and the 
recruiting criteria loosen; the new employees may lack the necessary understanding of risks. Cultural ch nges 
are more difficult to implement: the messages about the importance of risk could get lost in their way from the 
top to the front office. According to Simon the rate of expansion is one of the determinants of the lev l of risk 
assumed (Simon, 1999). Highly diversified financial institutions have a more fragmented risk culture and
struggle with cultural clashes between business unit 15. The optimal size change depending on the businesses. 
In some of them, the economies of scale and scope are more relevant, as it appears by comparing universal 
banking, asset management and payment institutions with community banking and private banking. 
The ownership model is one of the first driver of organisational culture. A public company is particularly 
exposed to the pressures coming from financial investors. They are more inclined to assume risks in order to 
increase the bank’s profits and their wealth. This pressure is heightened by the risk shifting behaviours f the 
shareholders, consistent with the asymmetric incentiv  system of the limited companies: unlimited profits 
versus limited losses. Other ownership structures a more risk averse: in a state owned bank stability comes 
before profitability; in a mutual bank the owners have a long term horizon and are also customers; in a family-
owned banks the shareholders have a large portion of their personal wealth invested in the bank.  
                                                          
14 “We found small and medium sized institutions had better cultures. Instead of struggling with ‘turning around the 
supertanker’, their senior management were mainly focused on reinforcing more customer focused cultures. These 
smaller banks seemed to have significantly different cultures from the largest institutions. Big banks have made progress, 
but in terms of culture change the smaller players are still out in front” (Spicer et alii, 2014, p. 10). 
15 “We should also note that there is a significant challenge to instilling shared values in a universal b nk like Barclays. 
Cultural compatibility is difficult to achieve across businesses which may attract very different employee profiles, and 
where the business model and objectives are different. It takes a great deal of finesse to translate the same common values 
into credible expectations of a trading floor and of a retail branch network. This task is made harder when, as at Barclays, 
rapid growth (which propelled it from a family bank to a leading universal bank), multiple reorganisatons and extensive 
external hiring (particularly in the investment bank) create a less stable cultural base” Salz Review, 2013, p. 80. 
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Laeven and Levine (2008) find that banks with fragmented and diversified ownership and with more powerful 
owners tend to take greater risks. This is consistent with theories predicting that equity holders have stronger 
incentives to increase risk than nonshareholding managers and debt holders and that large owners with 
substantial cash flows have the power and incentives to induce the bank’s managers to increase risk taking. 
The change in ownership structure, from a partnership tatus to the stock exchange listing, is seen as an 
important reason for the weakening of the risk culture in US investment banks (The Economist, 2013). 
The role of the national culture is investigated by Hofstede (2004). At the macro-leve , national culture can 
explain the institutional, legal and economic environment of a country and its influence on corporate isk-
taking decisions. At the micro level, culture affects individual risk-taking behaviours. Mihet (2010) finds that 
the impact of national culture on risk taking is stronger in industrial sectors which are more informationally 
opaque, e.g. finance: financial institutions in countries with low uncertainty avoidance, high individualism and 
lower power distance take significantly more risk. The same findings are confirmed by Ashraf et alii (2016). 
Kanagaretnam et alii (2011) show how in the years previous to the crisis (1993-2006) national culture 
influenced the quality of banks’ earnings: aggressive r sk-taking activities were more likely in countries with 
low uncertainty avoidance and high individualism. Breuer et alii (2014) highlight that individualism is l nked 
to overconfidence and overoptimism and has a significa tly positive effect on individual financial risk-taking.  
Individualistic cultures emphasise self-orientation, autonomy, individual achievements (Hofstede, 2004). 
Managers are evaluated and rewarded based on their short-term financial performance. In countries with 
individualistic cultures, the concern for other stakeholders and for public interest is likely to be low; by 
consequence, customer and compliance risks are highr. National culture is linked to business risk culture 
because some businesses are more widespred in specific countries. As an example, the business culture of 
investment banks has its roots in US economic culture: meritocracy, focus on results and performance, 
efficiency, optimism and self-esteem (sometimes arrogance), risk propension. On the contrary, European r tail 
banks (apart from UK) share “social market economy”. In almost all Japanese financial institutions, it is 
difficult to rely on mechanisms such as speak up and whistle blowing: This is due to the collectivist culture, 
the respect for the hierarchy, and also a tendency to hide the bad news in order to avoid the shame. When 
analyzing the culture of asset management industry, Basile (2001) finds differences between Anglosaxons, 
Europeans and Japanese institutions.  
We use the term strategic orientation with regards to the main trade-off  choices that must be taken at a strategic 
level. First trade-off: short-term vs long-term perspective of the business; in the first case, the attention to risk 
decreases. Second trade-off: shareholder vs stakeholder orientation; in the first case, customer and compliance 
risks are probably higher. Third trade-off: transaction vs relationship approach to business; in the first case, 
the attention to customer risk is lower. Fourth trade-off: innovation vs stability; in the first case, the propension 
to risks is higher. Fifth trade-off: profitability vs risk; in the first case, the risk appetite is higher. These choices 
depend on the business in which the financial institution operates. As an example, a stakeholder approch is 
more widespred in community or mutual banks; a share older approach in global universal banks. A 
relationship approach is more common in corporate bnking, private banking, retail banking; a transaction 
approach in trading, some sectors of investment banking, product specialists. Investment banking is 
innovation-oriented; retail banking is stability-oriented.  
The organisational systems and practices have a two way relationship with business culture. Firstly, they 
should be an expression (artifact) of the business culture, and as such they should reinforce it. But they also 
might work in the opposite way: if they are not consistently designed, they forge a practiced culture hat is 
different from espoused culture. In this sense, the importance of performance measurement and compensatio  
systems should be stressed. For instance, if the risk culture statements underline the attention to risk, but the 
pay for performance systems are based on short term profitability indicators, the organisational risk awareness 
weakens. The described effects vary according to the business: e.g., the importance of “pay for performance” 
systems is by far higher in investment banking than in other financial industries. Another relevant 
organisational choice is between teamworking and internal competition. The latter lowers the peer control and 
increases the pressure for individual financial performance. Some businesses are more oriented towards 
teamworking, e.g. investment banking; other to individual competitiveness, e.g. securities trading and sales. 
The employees’ individual culture is one of the cultural layers in the firm, that interacts with the culture of 
working groups, organisational units, businesses, hadquarters16. When using culture as a risk governance 
                                                          
16 Empirical works indicate that risk preferences are partly genetically determined (Cesarini et al. 2009; Barnea et al. 
2010), and partly learned through cultural transmision by parents and peers during childhood and adolescence (Dohmen 
et al. 2011; Booth and Nolen 2012; Eckel et al. 2012). Individuals’ risk preferences may also be shaped in adulthood, by 
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mechanism, we assume that corporate culture can influence individual culture. On the reverse side, the culture 
of personnel affects corporate culture. An organisation composed by young men is more risk-oriented than one 
with more aged personnel or more women. Partly, the culture is vehiculated top down, through leadership, 
“tone from the top”, the design of organisational mechanisms such as incentive systems. Partly, it is created 
from the bottom up, by the people who work inside th  organisation17. People prefer to work in the business 
that better reflects their own values. In doing that, they strenghten the existing organisational culture. People 
who apply for job in a community or retail bank are less aggressive, less competitive and less risk-oriented 
than individuals who search for a job in investment banking. The latter are more materialist and less inclined 
to social values (Augar, 2014) 18.  The social sensibility is even more pronounced in ethical banking, ethical 
funds, mutual banking. The ethnographic study by Ho (2009) shows how in the 1980s the Wall Street 
investment banks addressed for hiring to “the best and the brightest” recent graduates of elite schools (in 
particular Harvard and Princeton). These recruits went to Wal Street by bringing with them their social norms 
and values: individualism, ambition, competitive nature, high risk propensity, often greed and low moral 
integrity. As newer hires were promoted, and older members departed, a new culture developed within 
investment banks, replacing the old one. 
 
c) Evolutionary factors 
In the life of a financial institution, risk culture changes. Some events may weaken it: difficulties in producing 
satisfactory financial results, together with incresing competitive pressures; cost-cutting programs to improve 
cost/income; rapid growth; efforts to fulfill organisational integration in M&A operations; high recourse to 
outsurcing without monitoring the risk culture of the partner; arrival of a new chief executive officer more risk 
inclined, and so on (Smith-Bingham, 2015). 
Also the contingent factors above described change over time. In this case, they operate as evolutionary factors 
of the business risk culture. Some of these changes may affect all the businesses (convergent evolutionary 
factors), others might affect only one or a few busine ses (divergent evolutionary factors). 
In the years previous to the financial crisis, the contingent factors operated as convergent factors, leading a 
process of cultural transformation towards a weaker risk culture. At the same time, quite paradoxically, the 
risk management tools became more advanced and the regulation on risk became more stringent: think of 
Mifid, Basel 2, rules on internal controls, compliance, antilaunderying, corporate governance. In this conflict, 
as often happens, culture wins: if the risk culture weakens, people can always find some way to circumvent 
internal and external rules. The evolutionary factors made riskier the risky activities of investment banks and 
made less prudent the more prudent commercial banks. The most important of these factors are described 
below.  
-The growing competition of the market made more difficult for a financial institution to survive and increased 
the importance of the comparison between banks’ performance. As an example of this new environment, one 
can quote the “famous” interview of The Financial Times (2007) to the former CEO of Citigroup, Chuck 
Prince. Referring to the loans provided by the bank for financing private equity deals, he said: “When the 
music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got 
to get up and dance. We’re still dancing”. 
-The deregulation removed many constraints on risks. The principle-based, light touch regulation was based 
on two assumptions: self-control by cautious financi l institutions and self-correction by efficient capital 
markets: both these assumptions were flawed. We remind only a few examples of this deregulation: the 
allowance to adopt internal models for the calculation of capital adequacy (Basel 2); and, in US, the removal 
of the net capital rule for the largest US broker-dalers (2004), the end of separation between investment and 
commercial banking (1999), the amending of Community Reinvestment Act as to liberalise the subprime loans. 
                                                          
significant life events, such as natural disasters (Eckel et al. 2009), economic conditions (Guiso et al. 2015), and violent 
conflicts (Voors et al. 2012, Callen et al. 2014). Cohn et alii show how individuals’ risk preferences are also malleable 
through the work environment. (Cohn et alii, 2015, p. 6). 
17 Lo (2015) describes this effect, which he calls the “compositional effect”. 
18 “However, you have to think what is the product of investment banking? The product is money. And I think there is 
something different about a business where the product is money. I think that it attracts a different kind of person and I 
think that it breeds a different kind of behaviour. That presents the industry with a real challenge if it is going to change 
the culture. It has to recognise that it is dealing with a different kind practitioner, a different kind of professional to, say, 
the architect or the lawyer. It is not insurmountable ut I think it is a really very high barrier”. Cfr. Augar, 2014, p.  6 
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-The bank ownership changed under at least four aspects: a) from state-ownership to private ownership for 
european commercial banking sector; b) from concentrated ownership, with an industrial and long term 
approach, to a fragmented ownership (public company), with institutional investors adopting a short term 
perspective19; c) from partnerships to listed joint stocks companies for US investment banks; d) from 
cooperative to limited companies for UK building societies. All these changes led to a more risk-oriented 
culture (Goldstein and Burditt, 2015; The Economist, 2013). 
-As a consequence of previous factors, the objectives of the financial institutions shifted towards an higher 
emphasis on financial results and a lower attention to customers, personnel and social dimension. Growth, 
profitability and efficiency became the main goals of financial institutions. In many retail banks, the more 
prudent risk culture was replaced by a “profit culture”, whit an excessive exposure to productive risk and by a 
“sales culture”, whith excessive exposure to customer risk. In British banks the aggressive sales culture has 
been acknowledged as a major driver of bank failure (Spicer et alii, 2014). It led banks to promote financial 
products, irrespective of risk and customer needs, to make riskier loans, to engage in bad practices20. Also the 
poor outcomes of Barclays have been seen as a consequence of a corporate culture too biased towards 
commercial and competitive features, with little regard for other elements, such as the interests of the customer 
and of the overall society (Salz Review, 2013, p. 79)21.  
-The success story of more aggressive investment banks, with impressiv profitability and growth in the years 
previous to the crisis, became the benchmark to emulate for largest commercial or universal banks22. The 
investment banking divisions were by far the most profitable part of the financial conglomerates. The capital 
markets too went through a long period of stability (the Great Moderation) and risky securities seemed to be 
less risky. Though the selling of risky products such as the credit default swaps, AIG could achieve high growth 
rates in the traditionally low-growth insurance industry23. 
-Growth and diversification: as said before, the mainstream business model required a bank to grow, to expand 
internationally, to diversify, to become more complex and interconnected. As a consequence, the risk 
management became more difficult and more bureaucratic, the risk culture lost homogeneity, the distance from 
the customers increased and the relationship with them became more impersonal24. Risk controls were put 
under pressure and they were seen negatively, as a limit to growth and profitability. In the diversified financial 
conglomerates, the risk culture of retail banking clashed with that of investment banking. In many cases, the 
latter prevailed, given the better financial performance. At Barclays the old retail and commercial bank culture, 
with its emphasis on strong relationships with customers, was challenged. The new bank’s leadership, put in 
charge in 2007, tried to mimic the performance of investment bank division, with aggressive growth, less focus 
on controls and risks, a shift from customer orientation towards size and financial performance (Salz Review, 
2013). 
                                                          
19 Haldane (2011) shows how, between 1998 and 2008, the average holding period of bank stocks for US and UK banks’ 
investors fell from almost three years to three months.  
20 The incentive systems were a key driver of this cultural change. “Increasing sales were reinforced through incentive 
systems which rewarded shop-floor staff for up-selling. Staff performance was typically made public through whiteboards 
which displayed employees who were leading sellers and who were laggards. Achievements in sales were publicly 
celebrated. Not achieving sales targets was punished…In one Halifax branch, there was a weekly ‘Cash or Cabbages 
day’. Employees who exceeded their sales were publicly rewarded cash. Those who missed their bonuses were given 
cabbages” Spicer et alii, 2014, pp- 20-21. 
21 “In our view, Barclays did not, until recently, have a clear statement of a common purpose across its businesses. It 
rather emphasised growth and financial success…Over the period studied by the Review, the push for growth in the 
investment bank and Wealth, coupled with the need to increase returns in Retail, seems to have replaced th  Group’s 
sense of purpose and its customer focus.”(Salz Review, 2013, p. 79).  
22 “Over the past 35 years it has seemed as if everyone in finance has wanted to be someone else.  Hedge funds and private 
equity wanted to be as cool as dotcom.  Goldman Sachs wanted to be as smart as a hedge fund. The other investment 
banks wanted to be as profitable as Goldman Sachs.  America’s retail banks wanted to be as cutting-edge as investment 
banks. And European banks wanted to be as aggressive as American banks. They all ended up wishing they could be 
back precisely where they started” The Economist, 2009, p. 18. 
23 “Paradoxically, the moral hazard of past success may h ve led AIG to make much riskier investments than a company 
with a poorer track record of risk management” (Lo, 2015) 
24 “The bigger the bank, the greater the distance from the customer… the detachment of bankers from the clients they 




Another example is UBS: investment banking was allowed to dominate group activity, which led to massive 
losses on US sub-prime mortgage-backed assets (The Economist, 2009). Spicer et alii (2014) describe th 
diversification process of UK retail banks. They had traditionally been relatively conservative institutions, with 
simple business model and an important role played in their community. During the 1980s, they moved from 
a branch banking model to a universal banking model, by expanding their riskier activities on the wholesale 
side of the market. As the banks extended beyond the relatively simple business model of the past, retail 
divisions faced increasing pressure to high rates of profit. To address this challenge, they developed aggressive 
sales cultures. They refashioned themselves as machines for aggressively marketing new financial products to 
customers.As a result, ‘tellers’ within bank branches started to see themselves as ‘sellers’”. 
-The product complexity grew; culture is also knowledge, and the increased opaqueness of products 
undermined the ability to understand and to manage the risks involved; often, the difficulty to grasp the 
complicated technical features of new products went together with a sort of arrogance and an overestimation 
of the effectiveness of risk management systems. 
-Some organisational practices contributed to lessen risk awareness. A key role was played by incentive 
systems, that over time accounted for a rising share in the employees’ compensation, and in all sectors of the 
financial system25. They were based on financial indicators that were flawed: not risk adjusted, backward 
looking, easy to manipulate. They relied too much on short-term financial results and neglected other factors, 
such as the quality of service to customers, the sustainability of the business, the compliance to rules and 
controls. They sponsored a “profit culture” and a “s les culture”, instead of a “risk culture”.  
- Also the individual culture of the personnel changed. Gordon Gekko became the idol of the new graduate 
generation, whose appetite for risk was accurately d scribed by the “greed is good” motto. An “adverse 
selection” process came out: aggressive and risk lovers people started to flow towards the more successful and 
dynamic sectors of the financial system.  
- In more general terms, it was the economic culture that changed. It leaned towards a quite extreme 
interpretation of free-market model, with emphasis on the efficiency of capital markets, their ability to spread 
and to reduce risk, the usefulness of financial innovation. The overvaluation of these virtues went had in hand 
with the underevaluation of risks. 
 
 
4. The rise and fall of risk culture in investment banking: the Great Detachments 
 
As described in the previous paragraph, some evolutionary trends in the financial sector have determined a 
process of weakening of the risk culture in all financial insitutions, independently from the particular business 
in which they operate.  To some extent, the largest US investment banks represent an interesting case study, 
for many reasons: they were at the root of the financial crisis, they paradoxically had the more sophisticated 
risk management systems, they were seen as very smat in assuming and controlling risks, they represented to 
some extent a successful business model to imitate…nd they failed spectacularly. And this failure probably 
has more to do with risk culture than with the effectiveness of organisational tools. 
Some literature describes the flaws in the risk culture of these institutions, particularly in the capit l markets 
business, and trading & sales departments. The appro ch is anedoctical, consisting of narrations drawn from 
the personal experiences of former employees. It resembles the ethnographic methodology of research, 
particularly useful to study organisational culture, where the conclusions are drawn from participant 
observation26. In fact, the true culture of the organisation is ot described by official documents, rules or data. 
It is revealed by the choices made by the people in their sphere of authonomy, by their ways to gain social 
appreciation, by their reactions to unexpected problems or, at the opposite, by their routine behaviours in the 
ordinary course of business. All these aspects can be better catched  by sharing the experience (working at the 
bank), by direct observation of employees’ behaviours, or by interviewing people and reading stories. Based 
                                                          
25  Many inquiries have proved the role of perverse remuneration schemes as a cause of the financial crisis; e.g. IIF 2008, 
FCIC 2011, ICB 2011.  
26 Our main sources are Lewis (1989) about his experience at Salomon Brothers (SB), Smith (2011) about Goldman S chs 
(GS) and Luyendijk (2015), who interviewed over 200 people working at City’s investment banks. 
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on these literature, we will describe below the factors that are responsible for the “risk culture failure” in US 
investment banks. This failure can be linked to a rising separation between elements that otherwise should be 
strictly connected. The great divides: 
- Between finance and real economy: “It’s only mathematics !”. Finance is an economic infrastructure 
designed to serve financial needs of economic agents. If it loses this touch, it becomes self-referring, 
“unproductive” and risky27. When in 2005, for the first time, she met JPMorgan derivatives traders, Gillian 
Tett, author of Fool’s Gold, could watch them with the lens of her former studies in social anthropology. She 
could better understand their rituals: “The PowerPoints the bankers presented on topics such as the CDO
waterfall, did not merely convey complex technical d ta; they also reinforced unspoken, shared assumptions 
about how finance worked, including the idea that it was perfectly valid to discuss money in asbtract,  
mathematical, ultra-complex terms, without any refer nce to tangible human beings.” (Tett, 2009, p. xii) 
Serving-someone’s-need culture is replaced by a betting culture, that permeates the trading floor. “Traders 
would wager on anything: Wimbledon, the Masters, how many White Castle burgers a first-year analyst could 
eat” (Smith, 2011, p. 50; see also Lewis, 1989, p. 84) Traders love risks. Also managers love risk. The risk is 
good in itself. Lewis’ book starts with the challeng  that the CEO, Gutfreund, threw out in the trading room to 
the best player in Liar’s pocker (a sort of pocker game practiced by people at SB): “One hand, one million 
dollars, no tears” “What Gutfriend said – Lewis comments -  “has become a legend at SB and a visceral pa t 
of its corporate indentity” (Lewis, 1989, p. 14). Gutfreund wanted to show to everbody, as an example, his 
courage and his risk propensity: “No fear for the risk”. 
- Between material and human/social sides: “Money, money, money !”. Money is the core value of the business 
culture. It is the final measure of success. For young trainees, most successful traders are the business heroes. 
Managers have power and earn impressive amounts of money, they are feared and envied, but they are not the 
organisational heroes, because they “did not make the money for Salomon. (They) did not take risk.” 
(Lewis,1989, p. 16). Traders are the most respectable people because: “(They) were the people closest to the 
money. The firm's top executives were traders. There were even occasional rumours, probably started by the 
traders, that all the salespeople were going to be fired, and the firm would simply trade in a blissful vacuum. 
Who needed the fucking customers anyway ?”(ididem, p. 85).  
The power becomes a tyranny, that is socially accepted: the “tyranny of the trader”. “Some of the men who 
spoke to us (trainees) were truly awful human beings. They sacked others to promote themselves. They 
harassed women. They humiliated trainees. They didn’t have customers. They had victims. ..The point is not 
that a Big Swinging Dick (a very successful trader or salespeople) was intrinsecally evil. The point is hat it 
didn’t matter one bit whether he was good or evil as ong as he continued (to make results)” (ibidem, p. 86).  
The nicest place to aspire to work at is where money come from (e.g. fixed income securities, in the beginning 
of eighties at Salomon Brothers). When a trainee makes a silly question, the classmates blow up: “equity at 
Dallas !” (it means: “you are so stupid that you should sell equities at Dallas”, a very traditional and not so 
profitable business). Not only equity trading, but all the other businesses are despised because they are not so 
much profitable:  “corporate financiers are considere  wimps by traders” (ibidem, p. 23); “We all knew never 
to admit to an investment banker that we were also pplying for jobs with commercial banks, though many of 
us were” (ibidem, p. 32).  
Money means profits for the bank, but also it means bonus for bankers. For traders, the yearly bonus 
negotiation is the most important deal of the year. Chasing for the bonus creates an organizational climate of 
                                                          
27 “Many jobs in a competitive arm’s-lenght financial system are problematic for two reasons. First, like the worker on 
an assembly line, the broker who sells bonds issued by an electric power  project rarely sees the electricity that is 
produced: she has little sense of any material result of her labours. ..Second, the  most direct measure of a financial sector 
worker’s contribution is the money – the profits or returns – she makes for the firm…The trader who short  the stock does 
not see the workers who lose their jobs or the hardship that unemployment causes their families: all he sees are the profits  
he will make if he turns to be right in his judgment”.  R.G.Rajan, 2010, p. 124  
16 
 
internal competitition, which damages risk culture by stimulating cheating and reducing collaboration and 
information sharing (Smith, 2011, p. 315). To get bonuses, people steal each other’s ideas (e.g. about new 
financial product; see Lewis, chapter 9). More directly, a manager can steal a part of the bonus of his 
salespeople, by crediting on their own account the commissions earned from trades (ibidem, p. 307). In 2005, 
Goldman Sachs changed its compensation system: it elim nated the subjective component related to how well
traders did their job ang how good they were for the organisation.The system became largely mathematical 
and exclusively related to how much business has been rought in. At the end of the year, a trader or a seller 
was paid a percentage of the amount of revenue next to his name. And everybody started to do anything that 
was possible to pump up the numbers next to its name (ibidem, p. 313). 
The pivotal role of money, of course, is not explicitly stated. Money’s mastery is not an “espoused value”, but 
a basic assumption, implicit and shared (Schein, 2010). When Lewis, in a job interview with Lehman Brothers, 
answers with honesty that he wants to become an investment banker because he wants to make money, he is 
kicked off. Only after, he knows from a friend who w rks at LB the why: “It's taboo. When they ask you why 
you want to be an investment banker, you are supposed to talk about the challenges, and the thrill of d ing 
deals, and the excitement of working with such high-caliber people, but never, ever mention money”. (Lewis, 
1989, p. 35). “Learning a lie was easy. Believing it was another matter. From then on, whenever an investment 
banker asked for my motives, I dutifully handed him the correct answer: the challenge; the people; the thrill of 
the deal…That the money wasn’t the binding force was, of course, complete and utter bullshit” (ibidem, p. 
36).   
SB’ CEO likes to say that money is not so important d criticises the excessive greed of the younger 
generations, but his hypocrisy is noted and resented by the mortgage traders. “It was easy for Gutfreund to say 
money didn’t matter. He paid himself more than any chief executive on Wall Street” (ibidem, p. 159). It seems 
to be a good example of how not to perform “leading by example” and “tone at the top” ! 
-Between the bank and the customer: “Screw’em, they’ll ventually forget about it !”. The only interests to 
serve are those of the bank. “(The manager’s) tradem rk response to any e-mail that had even a whiff of a 
client trade was a three-character e-mail back: “GC( oldman Sachs Commissions) ?” No other words; no 
question about why the client had done the trade, what the trade was, or anything else about it. Just how much 
money was made on the trade” (Smith, 2011, p. 308). Once SB launched a CDO divided in two tranches, one 
backed by the principal of securitised bonds (POs, principal only) and the other by the interests (Ios, interest 
only). It sold the first one to the customers and kept in the book the second one. The reason was that SB 
expected the market to crash, a situation in which the POs plummet and the Ios appreciate (Lewis, 1989, p. 
182). When a salespeople complains to a trader who lied to him and forced him to sell a bad security to his 
customer, the trader replies: “Look, who do you work f r, this guy or Salomon Brothers ?” (ibidem, p. 207). 
Once the presidents of SB said: “Customers have short memories”, and Lewis comments: “If that was the 
guiding principle of Salomon Brothers in the department of customer relations, that all was suddenly clear. 
Screw’ em, they’ll eventually forget about it ! Right. “ (ibidem, p. 208). This is the attitude embedd in the 
culture of the bank and, these are the socially accepted behaviours; the “strange thing” would be worrying 
about this. “I had made the mistake of trusting a SB trader. He had drawn on the pooled ignorance of me and 
my first customer to unload one of his mistakes. He has saved himself, and our firm, sixty thousand 
dollars...Bellyaching would also make me look like a fool..How could anyone be so stupid as to trust a trader 
? The best thing I could do was pretend to others at Salomon that I have meant to screw the customer. People 
would respect that” (ibidem, p. 208). Not only are th customers screwed; they are also despised. This is why 
a trader can humiliate a trainee who failed in impressing him by saying: “You are proof that some people are 
born to be customers”. And all the (other) trainees think it is the “funniest thing they had heard all day“ (ibidem, 
p. 213). At the London trading office of GS the informal organisational language calls the less sophisticated 
customers “muppets”. “Being a muppet meant being an idiot, a fool, manipulated by someone else. Within 
days of arriving in London, I was shocked at how many times I heard people – both very senior and veryjunior, 
refer to their clients as muppets. Where, I wondere, had this adversial viewpoint come from – the idea of the 
client as someone much less smart than you, someone you could try to take advantage of ?” (Smith, 2011, p. 
296). Augar (2010) describes the changing model of investment banking in UK, since the Big Bang on: the
17 
 
City’s traditional culture of independent advice and long-term relationship was replaced by the American 
model, in which the relationship with clients lasts no longer than the deal. “The client-banker dialogue ceased 
to be about trust and the client’s long term interests and became more abut today’s profit” (Augar, 2010, p. 
224). As said before, this is shown also by the corporate language of investment banks: “They categorized (the 
customers) by “size of wallet”, a crude but telling description of what really mattered to them” (ibidem, p. 
224). The time horizon in managing the relationship with the customer becomes shorter and shorter: “Bond 
traders tend to treat each day of trading as if it were their last. This short term outlook enables thm to exploit 
the weakness of their customers without worrying about the long term effects on customer relations. They get 
away with whatever they can.” (Lewis, 1989, p. 131). After all, serving customers’ interests is hampered by 
conflict of interest, a situation that worsened when the investment banks decided to enlarge the range of their 
activities and to be involved in proprietary trading alongside brokerage. In trading activites the bank acts for 
the buyer, for the seller and for its own portfolio. In M&A or private equity deals, it happens that the bank 
advises at the same time the buyer and the target company. “Under that scenario how can you possibly put the 
client first ? Which client do you put first ?” (Augar, 2014, p. 2). 
- Between bank and employees: “You want loyalty, hire a cocker spaniel” Employees’ interests are separate, 
sometimes in conflict, with that of the organisation. Human Resources policies of investment banks can imply 
described by the motto: “hire-and-fire”. “You’re a number. That’s the deal you make when you go to work in 
finance: you are a commodity” (Luyendijk, 2015, p. 86). The dismissal procedures are quite famous: you get 
a call from HR, you are denied the access to your pc, you pack your stuff and you are out of the door in five 
minutes. Nobody feels safe, never. “Every day you y’re getting closer to getting fired”, as one boss u es to 
say (ibidem, p. 88). In the corporate idiom, sudden ismissal are called “executions”, or “the cull” (the term 
used when infected cattle have to be destroyed). All this creates a climate of fear, a “toxic culture” (ibidem, p. 
93), where the internal cooperation is hampered (kill or be killed) and politics is very important. “You need to 
say hello to the right senior people at the right time. Team members co-operate but they are also in competition 
for a better ranking in the review. As you would exp ct, friend will give friend good rebviews”. (ibidem, p. 
89).  
If the bank is disloyal to its employees, employees are disloyal to the bank. Loyalty is not a core value; maybe 
it could be an espoused value, supported by senior management, but not a practiced value, shared by people. 
When SB tries to dissuade a manager to leave the bank, in the name of the loyalty to the firm, his answer is: 
“You want loyalty, hire a cocker spaniel” (Lewis, 1989, p. 254). The only link that bounds the employee to 
the employer is money; if a competitor offers more money, it’s time to go. This shortens the time horiz ns of 
the decisions made by the personnel. The weakening of the ties between bank and employees is also an effect
of the success and the rapid growth of the organization. The urgent recruiting needs loosen personnel selection 
criteria. Wrong people were selected, with low competencies, different personal values, low loyalty. “But that 
they let me – and other drifters like me – in the door at all was an early warning signal. Alarm bells should 
have rung. They were losing touch with their identity.They had once been shrewed traders of horseflesh. Now 
they were taking in all the wrong kinds of people.” (Lewis, 1989, p. 47). In three years, 75% of the the trainees 
in the class of Lewis (that of 1985) would leave thbank, compared with 15% in the past.  
This lack of loyalty, from both parties, shortens the time horizons of the employees’ decisions; the weight 
attached to present results (profits) overcome that of future results (potential losses coming from risk). “If you 
can be out of the door in five minutes, your horizon becomes five minutes. That was the essence of the stori s 
about zero job security…How realistic is it to expect “internal controls” to do their jobs in such a context ?” 
(Luyendijk, 2015, p.. 99). 
- Between bank and shareholders: “No more skin in the game !”. The ownership structure of investment banks 
changed, from partnership to listed public companies. This separated ownership and control, reduced 
commitment of partners, who lost “skin in the game” and exposed bank’s governance to the short term and 
profit oriented interests of shareholders.  
- Between productive and control functions: ”What do they want again ? Tell them I'll call back''. Controls 
and control functions are seen as obstacles to the business. Large investment banks have strong control 
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systems, but weak control culture. In the values’ hierarchy, profit, growth and bonuses come before risk
control. “To illustrate the point I reiterate the example of when I was a trader in a bank. The call hd come 
through from a member of the compliance team inside the bank, they were after the desk-head of the trading 
team I was working for. The desk-head, from whom they were seeking a response to a number of questions 
they had asked, replied. 'What do they want again?' followed by ‘Tell them I'll call back'. A few days later the 
call came again, and again the same response. This charade was repeated several times over the next couple f 
weeks. Finally, with patience running out, a terse email to the desk-head head was sent stating that they wanted 
a response by the end of the day or the matter would be escalated. The desk-head responded by sending back 
a short email with an attachment displaying his and the desk’s trading P&L for the year, both were exceptional 
and far in excess of budget. He added a very short message saying ‘Over to you'. The matter was not heard of 
again. I share this little vignette, not because there was any serious compliance breach, at least not in the 
context of the early 2000s, but to make a point about the attitude and mindset which was becoming prevalent 
in banks through the 90s and early noughties” (Goldstein and Burditt, 2015). In JP Morgan Chase, a bank with 
an outstanding reputation in risk management, “the w ale trades exposed a bank culture in which risk limit
breaches were routinely disregarded, risk metrics were frequently criticised or downplayed, and risk evaluation 
models were targeted by bank personnel seeking to produce artificially lower capital requirements.” 
(Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2013, p. 7). “We are tiger” –said another flow trader. “You want 
traders to be aggressive as they can and make the bank as much money as possible”. The risk limits that he 
had to stay in were his cage” (Luyendijk, 2015, p. 72).  
The Great Detachments just decribed became wider and entrenched in the organization because they found 
confirmation in the outstanding financial performance. The extraordinary results of investment banks i the 
bullish years before the crisis triggered a deadly imitation game and infected all the businesses. When CEO of 
Morgan Stanley, Philip Purcell, tried to follow a low risk strategy, he was dismissed by shareholders who 
wanted a more aggressive approach (Augar, 2010, p. 227) But Purcell was an exception, because no CEO 
wanted to be considered as a laggard and to be pushed down in the investment banking league tables. Success 
generated a corporate culture of hubris, overconfide ce and underestimation of risk. First and foremost, it was 
not a failure of some executives, nor the failure of some organisational tools (e.g. risk management systems). 
It was a failure in the business risk culture. 
 
5. Conclusions  
The nature of the business is one of the determinants of the risk culture in financial institutions. The direction 
and the intensity of this relationship depend on structural and contingent factors. The former are intrinsic and 
quite stable characteristics of the business, such as t e kind of activities performed, the customers s rved, the 
economics. The latter are factors that might change over time and that affect risk culture indirectly; if they are 
different in different businesses, they contribute to shape the business culture. We analysed the most i portant 
of them: market competitiveness, regulation, history and evolution of the business, size and diversification of 
the financial institution, ownerhip model, national culture, strategic orientation, organisational systems and 
practices, employees’ individual culture.  
In the years previous to the financial crisis, these factors moved along a common trend, that led to a weakening 
of risk culture in almost all financial institutions. This process was more pronounced in some sectors, such as 
investment banking. The analysis of the risk culture of the financial institutions in general, and of the US 
investment banks in particular, has highlighted its flaws. Undoubtedly, the weakening of risk culture caused 
at the micro-level the adoption of wrong risk management practices by banks; at the macro-level, the bursting 
of the financial crisis.  
As a consequence, the key role assumed by an healthy risk culture in the governance of financial institutions 
is strongly confirmed. 
 
